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INTRODUCTION 
Financial development has proved to be a perfect indicator and reliable 
proxy for economic growth.1 Capital Finance is one of the main vehicles of 
finance. Capital markets, as Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine showed empirically, 
can solely and independently lead to economic growth.2 The consensus about the 
importance of financial markets and, particularly, the role that capital markets 
play in modern economies, did not coincide with similar development patterns in 
capital market regulations and institutions in developed countries and elsewhere. 
Some developed countries continue to have weak capital markets, and other 
developing countries are struggling to construct theirs. This fact propelled many 
to question why some developed countries continue to have weaker capital 
markets, why legal and extra-legal institutions are efficient in some countries but 
not in others, and why some countries do not reform these institutions. These are 
questions of institutional performance and evolution, and why institutions 
perform differently in different countries. Nonetheless, this paper is only 
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concerned with the performance and evolution of legal institutions, focusing on 
capital market institutions.  
Two main theories seek to explain the existence of different capital 
market models and the continuation of less efficient legal institutions in different 
countries.  One theory relates to the legal origin of the country,3 and the other to 
political ideologies.4 Most importantly, all theories admit that legal institutions 
play a crucial role in capital markets’ development.  
Interestingly, development agencies such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank often disregard this debate in the literature when 
advising or aiding developing countries. These development agencies usually 
promote the idea that institutions matter for development and some institutions 
are better than others because they reduce the transaction costs. Normally, these 
development agencies advise the developing countries to establish their financial 
markets and adopt legal institutions in ways similar to those that exist in the 
developed countries. The United States and the United Kingdom have deeper and 
more liquid capital markets, and their models are normally the ones 
propagandized to developing countries. This often takes place without a 
comprehensive study of the political reality in the aided country.  
This paper establishes that the ultimate determinant of institutional 
efficiency is the country’s political authorities and elite. Institutions affect the 
rents that different groups can obtain, and the political powers will always strive 
to maintain their rents and positions. Under pressure, political powers can 
support institutional change, but they will skew enforcement as much as possible 
in order to once again emerge as winners in the outcome. Turning a blind eye to 
the political reality in a country will only lead to ineffective institutions and 
power limitations. Not assessing a country’s political reality will adversely affect 
the country and complicate future political and economical reforms. 
Several studies discuss the determinants of the efficiency of legal 
institutions related to financial markets, and they mostly depend on cross-country 
regressions. These regressions are usually based on generalities that can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); 
Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.   ECON. 1113, 1152.	  
4 MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL 
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (Oxford University Press 2003). 





sometimes dim the reality. Thus, this paper attempts to shed light on some new 
aspects while trying to fill the gaps. Empirically, the research herein shows that 
politics and political powers steer the success—or failure—of capital markets. 
This is established by the present case study of the Egyptian capital market from 
1990 to 2010, focusing on capital market regulation and corporate governance 
rules as proxies for investor protection. The study of Egypt demonstrates how the 
former political regime misused the aid from the IMF and World Bank, and their 
recommendations for transforming to a market-based economy, by creating a 
system of crony capitalism. This was a result of the nexus of business and 
political elites with aligned interests. Thus, when it was time to privatize banks 
and build the institutional requirements for a strong capital market, the elites 
emerged again as the winners from these reformations. This paper, through the 
lens of Egypt, throws a light on the prevalent scenario in other like-developing 
countries. This paper is structured in the following order: Part I briefly reviews 
the debate around what controls the effectiveness of the institutions required for 
capital markets. First, the New Institutional Economics’ assumptions about 
institutional changes are discussed; second, the legal origins theory is explained 
before adverting to a discussion on finance and politics literature; and finally, the 
distribution of power and its effect on institutional performance is introduced. 
Part II summarizes the most fundamental institutions required for developing a 
strong securities market, as they will be used as a yardstick for the changes in 
Egypt towards building a viable securities market. Part III assesses the history of 
Egypt and the reform programs of the period. The legal and institutional changes 
during this period are examined, focusing mostly on the Securities Market Law 
and Takeover Law. More importantly, while tracking the legal reforms, this study 
scrutinizes the politics behind these reforms and the role that political and 
business elites played. Finally, Part IV is an assessment of Egypt’s achievements, 









I. WHAT DETERMINES CAPITAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS’ 
EFFECTIVENESS? 
Many papers accentuated the prominent role of legal and extra-legal 
institutions in financial development and economic growth.5 Why do some 
countries have less efficient institutions than others, and why do less efficient 
institutions persist? 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) was the leading current in bringing 
legal institutions back to the economic development discourse and, thus, to the 
development agencies’ agendas.6 Douglas North emphasized that institutions 
matter.7 He defined institutions as: 
The rules of the game of a society, or, more formally . . . the 
humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. 
They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, 
regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of 
behavior, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the 
enforcement characteristics of both.8  
 
North’s main argument is that institutions can be wrongly designed due to 
transaction costs. For North, the explanation of why similar institutions have 
different results over time are the “following variables that would induce 
individuals to accede to and reinforce them: imperfect information, unequal 
bargaining power that allows powerful interests to design institutions to fit their 
ends at the expense of larger society, and "subjective models" that preclude 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Rafael La Porta et.al, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); 
Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.   ECON. 1113, 1152 (1998) 
[hereinafter Law and Finance]; see also Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) 
[hereinafter Acemoglu, Colonial Origins] (arguing that institutions in general are 
important, particularly through examining the effect of colonizers’ policies in different 
places they conclude that institutions have direct effect on income per capita. However 
they do not share the Law and Finance, supra, argument that institutions are 
predetermined by colonial policies, in fact they see that they can be changed from time to 
time). 
6 John K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development 
Orthodoxies and The Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 244 
(2007). 
7 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development, 
44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209, 227 (2011). 
8 Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, 
THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17, 23 (John 
Harriss et al. eds., 1995). 





individuals from perceiving institutional inefficiencies.”9 However, recently 
North has given greater importance to differences in informal rules and 
enforcement characteristics.10  
The NIE’s assumptions and arguments about the importance of legal 
institutions influenced different development agencies’ vision for economic 
reform. Institutions became an empirical measurement in the world development 
report.11 Particularly, most policy interventions advocated by these agencies 
focused on legal reforms.12 
The legal origins theory also influenced the development agencies’ 
reform strategy.13 A group of economists developed this theory in a series of 
empirical research studies, arguing that legal origins have a direct effect on the 
quality of laws a country has and are therefore pivotal in contributing to the 
development.14 Their seminal work shows that common law countries have a 
stronger securities market and a better developed financial sector because the 
laws in such systems afford greater protection to investors.15 Thus, these studies 
produced two important contributions: first, that certain institutions are better 
suited for developing strong financial markets,16 and second, that such 
institutions are more prominent in common law countries. Accordingly, this 
difference between common law and civil law countries explains the difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Chantal Thomas, The Future Of Legal Theory: Essay And Comment: Law And 
Neoclassical Economic Development In Theory And Practice: Toward An Institutionalist 
Critique Of Institutionalism, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1020 (May 2011). 
10 Douglass C. North, Centennial Lecture: Why Some Countries Are Rich And Some Are 
Poor, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 319, 321 (2001); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING 
THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (Princeton University Press, 2005); see also Dan 
Danielsen, Economic Approaches To Global Regulation: Expanding The International 
Law And Economics Paradigm, 10 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 23, 72-75 (2011). 
11 Thomas, supra note 9, at 996-997. 
12 See Thomas Kelley, Beyond the Washington Consensus and New Institutionalism: 
What is the Future of Law and Development?, 35 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 539, 545 
(2010).  
13 Daniel Oto-Peralías & Diego Romero-Ávila, The Distribution of Legal Traditions 
Around The World: A Contribution to the Legal-Origins Theory, 57 J. LAW & ECON. 561, 
615 (2014). 
14 Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.  ECON. 1152 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON.3 (2000); see also Rafael La 
Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 
(2008), http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/63538/. 
15 La Porta et al, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra note 14, at 286-
90.8 
16 Id. 





in strength of financial markets today.17 In the common law system, law is 
organic and constantly evolving with judges’ interpretation whereas the civil law 
system places greater emphasis on codification of clear laws that limit the judge’s 
creativity in declaring law.18 In context of investor protection, the economists 
argue that certain characteristics of common law systems such as fiduciary 
duties, judges’ flexibility, dependence on little regulation, and the wide role of 
private contracting foster capital markets’ growth. These facets make common 
law countries better situated in protecting investors, as civil law countries depend 
on heavy regulation.19 
The legal origins theory was contested on several grounds. Some 
criticized the economists’ coding of the law,20 while others criticized the 
qualitative link between origins and investor protection.21 Berkowitz, Pistor, and 
Richard argued that legal traditions did not influence the effectiveness of legal 
institutions;22 rather, they claim it is a country’s reception to its own laws.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Id. 
18 Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development, 
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 251, 253-60 (Claude Menarde & Mary 
M. Shirley eds., 2005) (reviewing the history of both common law and civil law 
traditions, they argue that English lawyers and judges were the winners after the 
revolution, thus law was always placed above the king. In France, however, the 
revolution sought to curb the powers of the judges who were seen as against the French 
revolution, thus the theory behind the Napoleonic code was to draft clear and 
contradictory laws so that judges have no authorities.)  
19 Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, And Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L.REV. 
460, 464-65 (2006) [hereinafter Roe, Legal Origins]. 
20 See generally ROGER M. BARKER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMPETITION AND 
POLITICAL PARTIES: EXPLAINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHANGE IN EUROPE, 110-15 
(2010). 
21 Roe, supra note 19, 466-467. 
22 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Transplant Effect, 51 
AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 165 (2003), http://www.pitt.edu/~dmberk/AJCL.pdf. 
23 See id. at 167. In fact, the transferability of laws and legal institutions from one country 
to another is a contestable matter with no consensus. For instance, Alan Watson the most 
prominent supporter of transplantation of laws argues that transplantation is the main 
source of legal development, whether recently or historically, that law is autonomous 
from the political, economic or cultural structure of a state and that it has a life of its own. 
Others like Kahn Freund state that the possibility of transplantation is variable but at a 
certain point a law can be deeply immersed within a state’s cultural and political fabric 
that it cannot be transplanted. A stricter version of this view can be found in Montisque’s 
opinion, where he claimed that in very few cases that a law of a state can benefit another. 
See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and European Private Law, Alan Watson 
Foundation (2006), http://www.alanwatson.org/legal_transplants.pdf (last visited May. 
20, 2015); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(2d ed. 1993). But see Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 





Nonetheless, the latter is related to another contestable issue – the transferability 
of laws from one country to another. Importantly, the debate about transferability 
of laws is greatly related to this paper’s research question. If the problem is in the 
transplantation process, then the context of the process is what really matters, and 
the reasons behind success or failure should be analyzed.24   
The most significant criticism of the legal origins theory came from the 
politics and finance literature, which represents the second main camp for 
explaining the disparity in capital markets’ strength and legal institutions in 
different countries.25 Two particular lines of argument in this literature are 
directly related to this paper. Mark Roe presents the first line of argument, and 
avers that the political ideology of a country explains the variations in 
institutional differences and strength in capital markets between the developed 
countries.26 He argued that the differences in investor protection between the 
United States and other developed countries in Europe are because the latter are 
more like social democracies.27 In social democracies, governments favor 
employees over capital owners in conflicts that occur between them.28 This 
inclination is against the shareholders’ interests, as risky expansions are not 
encouraged and hostile takeovers are not favored. This weakens many of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
MOD. L. REV. I (1974). John Gillespie, Towards A Discursive Analysis Of Legal 
Transfers Into Developing East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 657 (2008). See 
generally Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 251, 320-38 
(2003) for a review of this literature. 
24 John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country 
Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 
594 (2009).  
25 See PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE 
CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 (Princeton 
University Press 2005) (“We believe that, like other decisions about authority, corporate 
governance structures are fundamentally the result of political decisions.”). See, e.g., 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in The Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003); Roe, Separating 
Ownership, infra note 27, at 539; Mark J. Roe & Jordan I. Siegel, Finance and Politics: 
A Review Essay Based On Kenneth Dam’s Analysis of Legal Traditions In The Law-
Growth Nexus, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 781 (2009).  
26 See Roe, Legal Origins, supra note 19, at 502-05. 
27 Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership From Corporate 
Control, 53 STAN L. REV. 539, 543 (2000) [hereinafter Roe, Separating Ownership]. 
28 Id. 





institutions on which investor protection depend,29 which raises the agency cost 
and leads to less active capital markets in such countries.   
The second line of argument explaining the difference in institutions 
comes from Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, who criticized the legal 
origins theory to be “static . . . [and] apolitical”.30 They presented data starting 
from 1913 from civil and common law countries showing that at that time, 
several civil law countries had stronger securities markets than the United 
Kingdom. They argue that the legal tradition argument of Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (hereinafter 
LLSV) failed to explain these shifts in the strength of the securities markets.31 
Rajan and Zingales further argued that the legal origins theory was insensitive to 
political interest groups in different countries.32  The persistence of inefficient 
institutions in some countries can be explained not by the nature of common law 
compared to civil law, but by the fact that the quality of institutions in a country 
affects the rents that different groups can capture.33 Consequently, those who 
benefit from inefficient regulation lobby against changes, and as long they are 
more powerful, underdevelopment of legal institutions and financial markets 
persist.34 
 The main intuition behind the politics and finance literature was that 
“investor protection is a policy choice.”35 This explanation, though not prominent 
in law and finance, is more plausible. In fact, it is unbelievable that legal origin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See id. at 543-56. 
30 Andrew Kerner, The Political Economy of Investor Protection, EMORY UNIVERSITY 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 6-7, 17-18   (2009), available at 
https://etd.library.emory.edu/view/record/pid/emory:1f5ks (last visited Feb 27 2014); 
Rajan  & Zingales, supra note 25, at 5, 7.  
31 Rajan & Zingales, supra note 25; see also Thorsten Beck et al., Law, Politics and 
Finance 1, 20, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH Working Paper No. 2585 (2001), 
available at http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19682.  
32 Kerner, supra note 30, at 18. 
33 See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 25, at 18. They propose a theory of interest group in 
financial development in which their main argument is that financial development 
facilitates entry and increase competition. This hurts incumbents and lowers their profits 
because they originally rely on unequal access. Thus, they object to any changes to the 
regulation as a tool to limit competition. 
34 See id. at 21. 
35 Roe & Siegel, Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based On Kenneth Dam’s 
Analysis of Legal Traditions In The Law-Growth Nexus, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 781, 
788-89 (2009). 





continues to shape the difference in legal institutions and capital markets’ 
strength today for numerous reasons. Civil law countries enforce contracts and 
property rights to an extent comparable to the United States of America and 
United Kingdom, and have a comparable quality of law and priority on the rule 
of law.36 These countries could have easily built investor protections once there 
was a political will to do so, even if only a number of technical institutions were 
missing, because “their construction is not a rocket science.”37 
Next, the argument that common law depends on judge-made laws which 
allow for more flexibility38 is not precise for two reasons: (1) common law 
countries regulate extensively in the field of securities markets,39 and (2) the 
adaptability argument proposed is a mere theoretical construct that needs to be 
empirically proven.40 Moreover, one can argue that this adaptability in fact 
lowers predictability.41 A study that measured the indeterminacy (as a proxy or 
adaptability) in corporate fiduciary duties in Delaware, the United Kingdom, and 
Germany concluded that Germany had more indeterminate standards.42 This 
makes the argument that common law better protects investors because of its 
inherent adaptability and its less inclination to overregulation at least contestable. 
Finally, LLSV argued that Roe’s political economy theory is not 
warranted because his regression included only countries that were associated 
with World War II. They argued that there is no reason to selectively throw out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See Roe, Separating Ownership, supra note 27, at 602.  
37 Id.  
38 Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 
3, 9-12 (2000) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Investor Protection].  
39 Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, supra note 19, at 470-85 (Roe actually argues that 
common law and civil are coming closer to each other. As common law regulates more 
now and the judge in common law countries now is getting help from specialized 
agencies such as the SEC and from the exchanges, the role of the judge is not strong 
enough to lead to this difference. Roe further explains that on historical basis judges 
failed when there was no legislation to protect investors.).  
40 Andreas Engert & D. Gordon Smith, Unpacking Adaptability, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1553, 1561-70 (2009). 
41 Id. at 1561-62 (The ability of legal institutions to respond to behavioral changes is 
indeed important, but is not without costs. As when a court changes an existing legal rule 
this means it is engaging in policy analysis; this implies rejecting the legal authority. 
Therefore, the more responsive the legal system becomes the less people can rely on the 
legal rules. This system can suffer from both little adaptability and excessive 
adaptability.). 
42 Id. at 1570 (citing Jens Dammann, Corporate Law and Legal Determinacy, UNIV. OF 
TEX. SCH. OF LAW (2009), https://law.utexas.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/25/dammann_corporate_law_and_legal.pdf). 





data and stated, “[w]hen we use [the full available sample to run the Roe 
regression], the correlation reported by Roe disappears . . . . This may not be 
surprising: many developing countries stayed out of World War II, yet remained 
financially underdeveloped.”43 This last argument is problematic for two reasons. 
Firstly, it reflects an important gap in the literature where no detailed case study 
exists about countries that can show neither the relation between politics and 
finance nor legal origins and financial development in developing countries. 
Most of the studies are based on cross-country studies with no detailed analysis 
of these countries.44 In fact, many developing countries were not associated with 
World War II, but a detailed analysis would reveal that many, if not most, are 
underdeveloped due to political reasons. Secondly, the analysis does not make 
any distinction between developed and developing countries.   
Despite this heated debate in the literature and the wide criticism that the 
legal origins theory has faced, development agencies adopted the argument that 
common law is better suited for economic growth.45 This is critical as it can lead 
to a number of inefficiencies; by assuming common law tools are more powerful, 
efficient tools elsewhere can be overlooked. Further, failing to understand the 
political reality in the aided country can lead to futile changes and wasteful 
resources.46 
Central to this paper is the phenomena that politics affects legal rules and 
legal institutions differently in developing countries than it does in developed 
countries. Politically sensitive areas, such as corporate governance and financial 
regulation, are most critical, as these affect the rents that different political 
groups can capture.47 
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46 Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, supra note 19, at 464. 
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But how do political groups and rent seekers affect the performance and 
evolution of legal rules and institutions? The main argument here surfaces from 
the political settlement literature which expounds that an institution’s design does 
not lead to a certain outcome. In fact, the underlying political settlement is the 
main determinant for the performance of these institutions and the economic or 
political outcome.48  
Professor Mushtaq Khan defines the concept of political settlement as 
“an interdependent combination of a structure of power and institutions at the 
level of a society that is mutually ‘compatible’ and also ‘sustainable’ in terms of 
economic and political viability.”49 Khan also emphasizes that the political 
settlement in developing countries is different than that of developed countries. 
For Khan, developing countries’ political settlement is “Clientelist,” i.e. 
characterized by the exercise of power through informal institutions.50 According 
to Khan, 
Once a political settlement based on a compatible combination 
of institutions and power emerges, both the institutions and the 
distribution of power become supportive of each other . . . . The 
performance of new institutions and the consequences of 
institutional evolution can therefore be analyzed in terms of how 
institutions or institutional changes are likely to be resisted in the 
context of this specific distribution of power. The political 
settlement can therefore help to explain the performance of 
particular institutions because of specific costs of enforcement 
and resistance . . . . [T]he enforcement of a particular 
institutional rule is likely to be more effective if the distribution 
of benefits under that institution is not contested by groups with 
holding power, and conversely its enforcement is likely to be 
weaker if powerful groups contest its enforcement.51 
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Khan also states different types of arrangements between political and 
business elites affects the outcome and performance of different institutions.52 
Thus, the political settlement concept establishes a framework to understand how 
politics affects institutions. It also provides a lens through which to comprehend 
the determinants of institutional performance and evolution. 
Proceeding from this, the rest of this paper applies the political 
settlement framework on capital market regulations in Egypt. The paper 
investigates the evolution of investor protection laws and institutions in Egypt, 
and the politics behind these reformations, in order to comprehend what affected 
the performance and the quality of these institutions.  
Egypt represents an interesting case study specifically for the finance 
literature because until 1952, Egypt had an active and strong capital market. 
After the 1952 Revolution, however, the country adopted socialist policies that 
made the capital market completely stagnant before it was revived by a political 
decision. Then, in the 1990s, Egypt adopted the IMF development program 
which required many legal and institutional changes, most of which were Anglo-
Saxon rules. Curiously, Egypt passed through two waves of reformations. The 
first was futile because laws were introduced only on paper, but the second wave 
was more earnest. The following paragraphs focus on two main questions: first, 
was the first phase impeded because of the legal origins or the politics, and what 
induced the changes in the second one? Second, can real reformations be 
introduced without understanding the politics inside a country, and what can be 
concluded from this study? 
Since the primary concentration of this paper will be the capital market, 
it is useful to glance through the conclusions of some influential papers about the 
necessary rules and institutions for developing a strong capital market. This will 
guide the study of changes in Egyptian laws. It will also help in understanding 
why certain institutions were built and others were not.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See id. at 64. (“An important set of variations in the type of clientelist [sic] political 
settlement can be related to the organization of the ruling coalition. . . First, we look at 
the power of factions excluded from the ruling coalition relative to the ruling coalition. 
Secondly, we look at the internal distribution of power within the factions that constitute 
the ruling coalition, in particular between higher and lower levels. These dimensions are 
important for understanding the likely time horizon of the ruling coalition and its 
implementation capacities.”). 





II. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A STRONG CAPITAL 
MARKET 
A strong securities market must have a network of legal and market 
institutions that ensure the existence of a transparent market where material 
information freely and adequately flow to investors guiding them in making 
informed investing decisions.53 Such a market must also ensure investor 
protection from expropriation by insiders such as managers or controlling 
shareholders.54 In other words, in order to build a strong securities market, a good 
minority shareholder protection must be afforded and policymakers must 
envision solutions for asymmetry of information and self-dealing. Failing to 
protect investors will make them either refrain from the securities market or from 
discounting the price,55 which would naturally lead effective firms and issuers to 
avoiding capital markets because of the high price of capital.56  
Solving this issue is an uphill task: it involves developing sophisticated, 
experienced, and specialized courts and regulators who can police the capital 
market;57 imposing extensive financial disclosures which can provide investors 
with reliable information;58 and subjecting the financial reports to compulsory 
audition by independent accountants who are subject to appropriate risk of 
liability.59 In short, a myriad of legal and extra-legal institutions should be 
introduced, ranging from reputational intermediaries such as accounting firms, 
analysts, incentivized lawyers, 60 investment banks, and a financial press that 
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publicize any fraud acts,61 to adequate civil and criminal liability imposed on 
violators62 and a specialized court capable of applying these rules efficiently. 
Therefore, a developing country, when deciding to adopt a market 
system, must understand that copying laws in books will lead to a 
complete failure unless doing so is accompanied by a comprehensive 
knowledge of the entire web and structure supporting the system. 
Developing such institutions is not impossible, but doing so will affect the 
rents that different groups can capture from capital markets. Thus, in 
addition to developing the aforementioned institutions and rules, a polity 
that supports such reformations must exist. 
III. EGYPT’S STOCK EXCHANGE: AN OVERVIEW FROM 1990-
2010 
Recently, Egypt has been witnessing increasing efforts to develop and 
reform the financial sector, regulate markets and upgrade their organizational and 
legislative structures, strengthen capital structures of financial institutions, and 
protect investors' rights. These reformations were part of a larger privatization 
effort and a movement towards a free market. While it is true that these 
reformations led to the enhancement of the economic development of the country 
in the last few years, they did not survive Hosny Mubarak’s regime due to the 
inequality of distribution of wealth and corruption.63 
A. Egyptian Stock Exchange: A Historical Glance 
The Egyptian Stock Exchange64 is one of the oldest exchanges in both 
the Arab region and the world. It is located in Cairo and in Alexandria. The 
Alexandria Stock Exchange was established in 1888 and the Cairo Stock 
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Exchange followed in 1903.65 The Egyptian Exchange is not only one of the 
oldest in the region and was one of the most active exchanges in the world until 
the 1940s;66 it was ranked the fifth in the world.67 However, due to the socialist 
policies adopted by the government after the 1952 Revolution and until the 
1970s, and the wave of nationalization of firms, there was a concentration of 
ownership of the public sector and a near-complete paralysis of the capital 
market.68 The capital market remained stagnant until the 1990s, when it was 
revived after the issuance of the Capital Market Law of 1992 and the 
privatization efforts launched in the country.69 The state dominated the economic 
activity during this period, but was not able to sustain the economic growth that 
the country witnessed at the beginning, leading to the deterioration of the 
economy. The revolution established only the military. The existing business 
elites were all framed as anti-patriotic, which enabled the state to seize many of 
the privately owned enterprises and lands.70 Therefore, there were no competing 
powers in this era to force the ruling elite to adopt certain institutions. 
After President Sadat came into office in 1970, he adopted the “open 
door policy” to liberalize trade and transform the economy to a market-based 
economy.71 The open door policy made export related projects a priority.72  
Additionally, foreign investments were greatly encouraged and allowed foreign 
investors to take majority interests in some firms that had been reserved for the 
public sector. Arab investments were granted special privileges, and large stakes 
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of public sector firms were to be put up for private subscription.73 At the 
beginning of this era, there was a surge in the economy’s growth rate; however 
this was not directly related to the reformations introduced, but rather to the 
increase in revenues from oil, the Suez Canal, and tourism. Once the oil price 
plummeted in 1985, fiscal deficits rose to about fifteen percent of GDP and the 
country again was not able to sustain economic growth.74 Sadat’s era was thus 
characterized by an authoritarian military ruling with very weak, if any, 
capitalists or private entrepreneurs to push for certain reforms.  
B. The Revitalization Of The Stock Market, Legal And 
Institutional Developments, And The Politics Behind The 
Changes 
 
In the 1990s, Egypt’s deficit was rising to unprecedented levels, and its 
negotiation with the IMF led to Egypt adopting of the stabilization program.75 
This program directed the country’s policy to the liberalization of the economy 
and privatization of state-owned enterprises.76 Overall, the Stock Exchange can 
be said to have passed through two phases of developments in the legal and 
institutional structures since Egypt started its privatization program in the 1990s. 
During this period, the country transplanted a number of laws in order to shift to 
a market economy, increasing the role of the private sector and reforming its 
financial sector. For purposes of simplification and clarification, the studied 
period will be divided into two phases: 1990 to 2001 and 2001 to 2010. Each 
phase includes a discussion of the political effects on the transplanted legal 
institutions and their role in the development of the stock market. Thus, 
important changes in the legal and institutional structure are reviewed, followed 
by their political roles. Through a review of the entire process, this paper 
analyzes the real factors and determinants of the failure or success of the legal 
institutions necessary for developing the capital market.   
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1.   Phase (1): 1990 – 2001 
As previously indicated in section II, a prerequisite for efficient and 
healthy capital markets is addressing two main problems, asymmetry of 
information and self-dealing, in addition to a web of institutions that must exist to 
ensure the market’s adequate performance.77  
 At the beginning of this decade, Egypt was heavily indebted, forcing the 
government to accept the reform program the IMF and the World Bank 
introduced. This program aimed to transfer Egypt’s economy to a market-based 
economy and replace the public sector in the market with a strong private 
sector.78 At this time, the country’s capital market was totally dormant, and it 
only came back to life in 1992. The program seemed successful from 1992 to 
1998 as the economy continuously rose, many reforms were introduced (most 
importantly, the introduction of capital market law), the capital market was 
revitalized, the inflation rate was reduced to a single digit number,79 about one 
third of the state owned enterprises were privatized, and foreign investments 
were encouraged with new laws granting tax exemptions and protection for such 
investments.80 Egypt’s capital market was revived after more than 40 years of 
stagnation.81 The capital market’s capitalization increased from eight percent in 
1992 to about twenty-five percent in 1997,82 and total traded volume during the 
period 1996-97 reached 579 million shares—three times the traded volume of 
1992-95. Similarly, total traded value during 1996-97 recorded EGP 45 billion, 
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six times the total traded value during the period 1992-95. In 1997, market 
activity reached its peak with a turnover ratio of thirty-four percent.83  
Despite this upsurge in the Egyptian economy, which was inflated by 
number of factors,84 a number of exogenous negative incidents shocked the 
Egyptian economy and stock exchange by the end of 1997. These incidents—
namely, the Luxor terrorist Attack, the financial crisis of 1998, and several 
internal financial scandals—resulted in a slack in the economy and, later, the 
stock market’s collapse.85 The financial scandals led banks to adopt tight lending 
regulations, which exerted more pressure on the stock market.  Thus, the country 
strove to sustain the capital market by providing tax exemptions for those listed 
on the exchange.86 These actions led to an expansion of the number of listed 
companies, reaching more than 1000 in 2001.87  
Notwithstanding these encouraging numbers, Egypt’s attempt at building 
a strong and active securities market failed. Of the 1000 listed companies, the ten 
most actively traded represented seventy-five percent of the trading volume in 
2001, with average free float around twenty-five percent in the 50 most actively 
traded companies.88 Ownership was heavily concentrated and the public was 
discouraged to participate, which led to a slowdown in economic performance 
and a decline in average economic growth from five and three quarters percent to 
three percent as of 2002-2003.89 Noticeably, the capital market was not available 
as a means of financing corporations.  
What caused the boom and then this bust? Why did Egypt fail to build its 
securities market during this decade? Did the country’s adherence to civil law 
tradition hinder the construction of the capital market, or do other reasons exist?  
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To answer these questions, a review of the legal and institutional 
framework present at that time is required. After reviewing the legal framework, 
this section analyzes the reasons behind any shortages in the legal framework 
during this period and discusses the distribution of power at that time and its 
effects. The review of the legal framework is confined to shareholder protection, 
transparency and disclosure requirements, takeover regulation as a mechanism 
for disciplining management, regulation of financial intermediaries, and self-
dealing during this era. 
a. Shareholders’ Rights 
Shareholder protection is essential for securities markets in general, as 
investors generally face agency problems.90 They might be expropriated by 
insiders, whether controlling shareholders or managers, which can hinder the 
development of any securities market.91 Thus, a starting point for building a 
strong, reliable stock market has to be providing adequate protection to 
shareholders. This protection can be furnished through a variety of tools, and the 
first of which is by giving shareholders the right to control and steer their 
corporations. 
Shareholders’ rights were among the areas that were adequately drafted 
from inception: the protections that shareholders enjoy under the Egyptian Law 
are emphasized in the powers of the General Assembly (“GA”). There are two 
types of GA: Ordinary General Assembly (“OGA”) and Extraordinary General 
Assembly (“EGA”).92 The OGA has the following rights: to elect and fire 
directors at will, to monitor the management, to decide board members’ 
compensation, to review and approve financial statements, to decide dividend 
distribution, and to make any other decision that the directors or five percent of 
shareholders decide should be reviewed by the GA.93  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 La Porta et al., Investor Protection, supra note 38, at 1148-49. 
91 Id. at 1147-49, 1169. 
92 Law No. 159 of 1981 (Companies Law) art. 63 & 68, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, (Sept. 17, 
1981) (Egypt) [hereinafter CL]; see also Decree No. 96 of 1982 (Executive regulation for 
the Companies Law No. 159 of 1981) art. 200, Al-Wakae Al Masriya, (June 23, 198) 
(Egypt) [hereinafter ECL]. 
93 CL, supra note 92, at art. 61 (among other things: the OGA has many other rights, 
including the right to decide on the dividends policy, to make and use reserves, to appoint 
or dismiss auditors, and to allow self-dealing transactions); see also ECL, supra note 92, 
at Art. 216 & 217 (detailing a complete list of the OGA’s rights). 





Before the GA meets, directors are required to make available all the 
financial statements and any comments on those in the 30 days prior the meeting, 
the full auditor’s report, and the board of directors’ report about any 
remuneration paid to any of the directors. Shares within any class must have 
equal rights,94 and shareholders can easily obtain information about rights 
attached to their shares. Shareholders have the right to actively participate in the 
GA and address questions to directors and auditors,95 and they have the right to 
include their proposals in the agenda. They have the right to vote through 
proxy,96 yet there are certain limits, as the proxy has to be a shareholder, not a 
director, and cannot represent more than ten percent of the capital or twenty 
percent of the represented shares in the GA.97 Further, the decisions of the OGA 
are passed by simple majority of shares represented in the meeting.98 
On the other hand, the EGA has the power to amend the charter of the 
corporation, decide on mergers, or increase or decrease the company’s capital.  
The decisions of the EGA pass by two thirds of votes99 unless the decision is 
related to mergers, increase or decrease of capital, or dissolution of the company. 
In any of these cases, the decision has to pass by three-fourths of the shares 
represented in the meeting.100 
Unlike aforementioned, the legal rules that alleviate asymmetry of 
information or protect shareholders from self-dealing were not adequately 
drafted.  
b. Transparency 
A securities market’s transparency is an essential ingredient for its 
healthy functioning. Factually, transparency is even a prerequisite for 
shareholders to practice their rights. Transparency of a stock market can be 
upheld through different techniques, but the ones addressed in this section are the 
disclosure requirements that the law mandated.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 ECL, supra note 92, at art. 132 & 133. 
95 CL, supra note 92, at art. 72. 
96 Id. at art. 59. 
97 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Capital market law) art. 9, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya (June 22, 1992) 
(Egypt) [hereinafter CML]. 
98 CL, supra note 92, at art. 67. 
99 Id. at art. 70. 
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As previously stated, asymmetry of information between outside 
investors and insiders is a major stumbling block that the regulator has to solve in 
order to encourage investments. Unfortunately, in the intended decade, the rules 
ensuring transparency only required minimal disclosures: for instance, for a 
company to go public, it must issue a prospectus that must be accepted by the 
capital market authority (“CMA”), but the prospectus only requires basic 
information.101 Mandatory disclosure requirements of capital market law 
included balance sheets, income and cash flow statements, directors’ reports, 
changes in stockholder equity and board composition, and external auditor 
reports.102 The law did not require disclosing ownership structure, non-financial 
disclosure, or any rules that require disclosing foreseeable material risks, such as 
risks related to off balance transactions. Although CMA had the authority to 
examine compliance with disclosure requirements, it would do so only in case of 
non-compliance and publish its observations at the company’s expense.103  
The listing requirements did not mitigate this deficiency; they mainly 
allowed companies to list on one of three tiers: the “official schedule”, the 
“unofficial schedule 1,” or the “unofficial schedule 2.”104 The official schedule 
had the most stringent requirements. Hence, most corporations did not list on it, 
which decreased any benefits from listing rules, as the other schedules do not 
force companies to disclose more than what is required by law.  Further, they did 
not require a minimum number of shareholders or free float, which led many 
closed corporations to list, especially after the Income Tax Law No. 5/1998 
granted tax holidays to companies that list on the stock exchange.105  This led to 
the increase in market capitalization but no practical benefit or importance.  
Moreover, financial statements had to be in compliance with the 
Egyptian Accounting Standards, which are generally similar to international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 CML, supra note 97, at art. 4, 5 & 6. 
102 Id.  
103 CML, supra note 97, at art. 6.  
104 Bassam I. Azab, The Performance of the Egyptian Stock Market, THE BIRMINGHAM 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 34 (Sept. 2002), available at 
http://egx.com.eg/pdf/the_performance_of_egyptian_stock_market.pdf.. 
105 Ali A. Bolbol et al., Financial development, structure, and economic growth: the case 
of Egypt, 1974–2002, 19 RES. INT’L BUS. & FIN. 171 (2005). 





standards.106 Annual and semi-annual financial statements should be fully 
audited. The auditors have to be completely independent from the company and 
the board; accordingly, the auditor cannot be a founder, a board member, or an 
employee.107 The auditor is liable for misrepresentation and errors and should 
compensate the company and/or shareholders for any resulting loss.108 In spite of 
the previous, there was no obligation for companies to establish audit committees 
or other mechanisms to ensure oversight, nor was there a formal system in the 
country for monitoring auditors or a reviewing panel that had authority to 
discipline the practitioners. Therefore, in this period, the regulator overlooked, 
creating an incentivized and tightly regulated important reputational intermediary 
that is the accounting firms. Also during this period, the penalties inflicted on 
violators were weak, but the market had no tools to offset this weakness and 
punish the wrongdoers. 
c. Related Party Transactions (Tunneling) 
Likewise, the rules for related party transaction and self-dealing were 
weak. Though the Egyptian Accounting Standards requires directors and 
managers to disclose any material interest and the CL requires managers to 
disclose any conflict of interest to the board and abstain from voting in addition 
to notifying the GA,109 no sufficient requirement exists regarding the movement 
of assets between subsidiaries of the same holding company. Further, there are no 
clear rules on the transfer of assets, and the shareholders do not vote on this 
issue, especially since the majority shareholder at the subsidiary level and the 
majority shareholder at the holding level are often the same.110 Insider trading 
was addressed in one article111 that did not define non-public information, and the 
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107 Id. at 12. 
108 CL, supra note 92, at art. 109. 
109 Id. at art. 97-99. 
110 CL, supra note 108, at art. 67. 
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penalties of EGP 20,000-50,000 and/or prison terms of two years were not 
deterrent.112 Furthermore, takeovers were not regulated except by one article, 





Law without enforcement is toothless. Enforcement can be provided 
through market regulators, courts, and market participants. However, under this 
section, the concern is given to market regulators and courts only, as the market 
participants’ ability to enforce the rules depends on the powers and incentives the 
law gives them. 
The regulator, Capital Market Authority, was neither experienced nor 
effective. It employed only 250 personnel who were paid significantly less than 
their private sector and exchange personnel counterparts.113 For instance, CMA 
has wide administrative sanction powers, including warnings, delisting, and 
suspending and revoking licenses, but it did not effectively use these powers. 
Until 1999, only one tenth of all listed companies published their financial 
statements regularly, and not more than fifty percent sent their quarterly financial 
statements to CMA; nevertheless, CMA did not delist violators or revoke any 
licenses.114 Additionally, courts in Egypt usually take four to five years to decide 
cases. Thus, enforcement of the available inadequate protection was even further 
undermined.   
It is clear that, during this decade, the legal regulation and institutional 
mixture required for developing a strong and deep capital market was far from 
being complete; therefore, the stock market crashed upon the first real pressure.  
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to the extent that it affects the results contained in such reports”). 
112 Id. (before the change in 2008).  
113 The World Bank, ROSC, supra note 106 at 3. 
114 Nagwa A. Samak & Omneia A. Helmy, Foreign Portfolio Equity Investment in Egypt: 
An Analytical Overview CAIRO UNIVERISITY FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
SCIENCE) 27 (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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e. Why Did Egypt Fail? 
As indicated above, the main factor that propelled the country to change 
its regulations was the unprecedented rise of deficit and inflation rates, which 
shook the legitimacy of the ruling regime. At the beginning of this period (1990), 
the market economy of the country was still in the cradle of transformation, and 
not enough major private business players existed to form a pressure group to 
lobby for certain reformations.115  
In theory, liberalization of a country’s economy can lead not only to 
economic development, but also to political liberalization and democratic 
progress in the country.116 Liberalization would diminish the state’s power by 
ending its financial repression.117 In other words, before the economic 
reformations, the biggest banks, which were the only source of finance in Egypt 
at that time, were publicly owned.118 Therefore, the government easily controlled 
private sector development, and in return, business elites depended on their 
connections to obtain required finances.119 Theoretically, financial reformations 
can liberate business players from the state control of finance and thus be freed 
from state dependency. Consequently, this would revamp the political system and 
cause business elites to fund the opposition or themselves participating in the 
government.120  
The Egyptian government, anticipating the fast and complete 
liberalization of the economy, chose to proceed in this process in a slow, gradual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Larry P Goodson & Soha Radwan, Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant, 
or Merely Stalled?, 19 ARAB STUD. Q. 1, 14 (1997). 
116 Ito Hiro, Financial Development and Financial Liberalization in Asia: Thresholds, 
Institutions and the Sequence of Liberalization, 17 N. AM. J. ECON. & FIN. 303, 304 
(2006); see also Rajan & Zingales, supra note 25 at 7. 
117 See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Political Losers as a Barrier to 
Economic Development, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 126, 126 (2000) [hereinafter Acemoglu & 
Robinson, Political Losers] (arguing that “the effect of economic change on political 
power is a key factor in determining whether technological advances and beneficial 
economic changes will be blocked”). 
118Mahmoud Mohieldin, On Bank Market Structure and Competition in Egypt 15 (May 
2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.mafhoum.com/press6/179E13.pdf.  
119 Id. 
120 Stephan Roll, ‘Finance Matters!’ The Influence of Financial Sector Reforms on the 
Development of the Entrepreneurial Elite in Egypt, 15 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 349, 350-52 
(2010). 





pace.121 The governing regime adopted a selective reformation technique that 
would allow them to embed themselves. Thus, they tried to establish strong 
relations with a select group of businessmen based on mutual benefits, which can 
be called creating a system of crony capitalism.122  
Since that time, the relations between the regime and the business players 
have been developing steadily. In realization of this system, and to ensure the 
continuance of the regime after the economic liberalization of the country, 
several steps were taken. First, the process started in a slow pace privatizing very 
few companies, then they were sold to select entrepreneurs that the government 
trusted by underpricing or without competitive bidding. Those privatizations 
were even done in non-transparent means and away from the eyes of the public to 
create unnatural profits for members of the business elites that the regime 
selected and favored. An example of this is reflected in World Bank economist 
John Sfakianakis’s article: 
The networks that elite businessmen put in place in the mid-
1990s were not circumstantial. They were established as a result 
of the dwindling power of the public sector elite and the 
regime’s intention to see businessmen replace the bosses of the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The intention of elite 
businessmen to form networks was to perpetuate their monopoly 
power in the marketplace. It was not geared toward influencing 
the political landscape of Egypt whatsoever. These businessmen 
put in place conglomerates, which for the most part were neither 
vertically nor horizontally integrated, but were random 
collections of different business ventures, as a result of rent-
seeking patterns rather than competitive attainments . . . 
Certainly, the biggest privatization that Egypt experienced in the 
early stages of the privatization process was the sale of Coca 
Cola in 1993. It was a deal that involved most prominently, 
among other members of the political elite, the quintessential 
elite businessman of the 1990s, Mohamed Nosseir. He benefited 
from his relations with Atef Sidqi as well as Atef Ebeid to 
purchase with little competition the Coca Cola factory, which he 
resold two years later, at a price more than triple his cost.123 
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Another of the regime’s moves was to refrain from the privatization of 
public banks and use the financial resources available to fund the preferred 
network of business elites. Reports show that until 2000, a total of 343 
businessmen had received around forty-two percent of available credit in 
Egypt.124 Alarmingly, that credit was extended by phone calls and without 
sufficient collaterals.125 Bank loans were even sometimes extended to those 
entrepreneurs to allow them to purchase privatized assets.126 Finally, the regime 
helped a number of elite businessmen create monopolies that perpetuated the 
position of both political and business elites as dominant players in their 
respective fields.127 
Therefore, by returning to the question posited above—why did Egypt 
fail to develop a capital market?128—it is clear that the dominant authority had 
failed to establish the required institutions. They did so to entrench themselves by 
creating a layer of business elites that cannot challenge the regime’s legitimacy 
or authority129 out of fear of massive reformations that could destabilize the 
regime.130 In all cases, the reformations Egypt introduced, and those the country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Amr I. Adly, Politically-Embedded Cronyism: The Case of Post-Liberalization Egypt, 
11 BUS. & POL. 1, 11 (Jan. 2010). 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
127 Sfakianakis, supra note 123 at 80. 
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creditworthiness after the Gulf War. Regarding the privatization program, in 1996, 
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129 Alison Elizabeth Chase, The Politics of Lending and Reform: The International 
Monetary Fund and the Nation of Egypt, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 193, 223 (2006). 
130 Id. (Chase precisely described the politics at this period when she stated: “For a 
regime undergoing a crisis of legitimacy and paranoid of terrorism and social activism . . 
. [T]he Egyptian government was compelled to implement a certain degree of reform . . . 
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to adopt a strategy of delay and gradualism in implementing structural adjustment . . . 
economic policy in Egypt resulted from the relative balance of international pressure, the 
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abstained from interjecting, were not a matter of legal tradition but of political 
convenience and congruence.  
 The next phase will show that even if Egypt failed to adopt the required 
institutions when the political will existed and the distribution of power changed, 
this created a coalition that supported the existence of a well-functioning capital 
market, which negates the assumption that civil law impedes change.  
f. Summary 
The distribution of power at the beginning of the 1990s was 
characterized by a dominant ruling party supported by the military. At the same 
time, socialist policies adopted in the preceding years and nationalization and 
seizure of many of the privately owned properties led to existence of very weak 
business elites. Their ability to absorb costs or inflict costs on the ruling regime 
was nonexistent. However, due to a bad economic situation, this political 
settlement could not be sustained. With the existence of external pressure for 
reformations, the ruling regime had to introduce reforms. In addition, the ruling 
regime understood that such reforms could reduce its power. This was 
exacerbated by an absence of business elites that could demand certain reforms 
or put additional pressure on the ruling elite. The result was the creation of 
ostensible reforms and ties with connected business players to ensure their 
support in the future.  
The transplanted capital market institutions were not complete and did 
not consider the whole web of necessary institutions out of fear of being a 
channel to fund opposition groups. The proposed institutions would have affected 
the rents that the powerful group extracted; thus, it resisted the changes by not 
introducing many necessary institutions and abstaining from enforcement of the 
ones they had to adopt. In short, the proposed institutions by the World Bank and 
the IMF were not supported by the existing polity, which led to futile changes. 
      2.   Phase (2): 2002-2010 
The economic crisis Egypt witnessed at the turn of the 1990s disturbed 
the legitimacy of the existing regime. The Asian financial crisis had a spillover 
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effect on the Egyptian economy, in addition to other indigenous incidents 
attributable to the bad loan scandals and the tourism problem at that time, which 
was affected by terrorist attacks.131 This made the government push for banking 
sector reforms, which, in turn, led to a credit scarcity for the private sector. The 
credit available was subject to tight conditions for obtaining it. The capital 
market, with the weak, thin legal and extra-legal institutions existing at that time, 
failed to balance the shortage of liquidity. At the end of 2001, the capital market 
collapsed, the value of trades fell sharply, and the country’s economic growth in 
general slowed down. In other words, the excessive rents and accumulations that 
had to be granted at the preceding phase and the exogenous incidents made the 
political settlement unviable. 
However, by the end of the 1990s, the distribution of power was not the 
same. The relation between political elites and business elites was taking an 
important turn. Specifically, the alliance between political elites and business 
elites was deepened by the rise of Gamal Mubarak, President Hosny Mubarak’s 
son.132 Gamal Mubarak, who was being groomed to be his father’s successor, had 
been an investment banker and worked for Bank of America in London for 
several years before he joined the National Democratic Party (NDP)133 in 2000. 
Gamal Mubarak established the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) 
in 1992 with other members of the elites on its board, such as Ahmed Ezz,134 
Mohamed Mansour,135 Rashid Mohamed Rashid,136 Ahmed El-Maghraby, and 
Nassef Sawiris, all of whom were owners of the biggest corporations in the 
Egyptian economy, and all of which have monopolies or quasi monopolies. The 
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135 Mohamed Mansour controls a number of top companies in Egypt and served as a 
transportation minister from 2006 until 2009. 
136 Rashid Mohamed Rashid owns Fine Foods, one of the biggest companies in Egypt that 
later merged with Unilever. He was a minister of trade and industry from 2004 until 
2011. 





ECES became an important link between the business elites and the political 
elites.137 It particularly became the main neo liberal think tank for the second 
wave of the reformations.138  
Gamal Mubarak, unlike his father, is not a member of the military and, 
therefore, had no support from the armed forces. Hence, he had to resort to the 
business elites for support and, naturally, they supported his ambitions for 
political leadership in return for him advancing their interests. Thus, it could be 
said that his relationship with them was a “partnership of convenience”139. 
The President’s son had the view of a liberal economic system within a 
strong state.140 But, because he needed the business elites’ support, he had to take 
care of their interests. When Gamal formally joined the NDP, he took with him a 
number of the business elites, and they presented what Gamal called new 
thinking to revise the NDP economic program. He was also behind the 2005 
cabinet shuffle, where six of the ministers were directly linked to him.141   
The new cabinet launched a comprehensive financial sector reformation 
plan. Reformation of the securities market was at the heart of this plan. In fact, 
many of the reformations addressed the shortfalls of the preceding decade. The 
legal and institutional framework of the capital market developed steadily in the 
second phase, providing the required protection and transparency required by the 
investors. By focusing on the same framework developed in section II above, and 
contrasting the changes in this period to the period of phase 1, the following 
subsection reviews the legal and institutional changes that took place during this 
period. This paper will then analyze the reasons behind the changes and how 
political incentives were behind the reformations.  
a. Shareholders’ Rights 
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The new reformations have addressed many of the flaws and shortfalls of 
the previous era, introducing comprehensive improvements in the legal and 
institutional framework. The new developments provided more protection to 
shareholders and investors. In 2001, the Central Depositary Law No. 93 came 
into force. It required all public companies to register their shares as a condition 
for listing in the Exchange.142 Thus, settlement of transactions now takes one day 
for treasury bonds and same day for securities intermediaries licensed by the 
CMA to do same day trading.143 This protects shareholders from the risks 
associated with material receipt and delivery of securities.  Moreover, cumulative 
voting and class actions were introduced. Also, the new listing rules added to 
these safeguards by protecting shareholders from suffering illiquidity in case the 
corporation decided to delist, as it imposed an EGA decision with a three-fourths 
voting requirement granting the dissenting shareholders a withdrawal right and 
imposing on the company a duty to buy their shares according to the highest 
price in the last month,144 thereby empowering minority shareholders and 
enhancing their protection.  
b. Transparency 
 Similarly, the transparency and disclosure regulations witnessed a 
significant leap. The increased requirements were substantially added by the new 
listing rules, promulgated in 2002 and amended several times until 2010.145 The 
listing rules cancelled the old unofficial schedules. The new rules required a 
minimum number of shareholders (not less than 100) who own at least five 
percent of outstanding shares.146 Likewise, the listing rules required every listed 
company to disclose its ownership structure, to disclose any person holding more 
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than five percent of its shares, to disclose affiliated or controlled companies,147 
and to appoint investor relations personnel to answer investors’ inquiries.148  
They also required the board of directors to issue an annual report that discloses 
any transaction between the company and any of its subsidiaries149 and obliged 
companies to disclose any change in previously filed information or any 
proceedings initiated by regulatory bodies against the company.150 Moreover, in 
order to limit fraud and ensure transparency and adequate disclosure of financial 
information, the listing rules required all companies to have an internal audit 
committee.151 A special corporation was affiliated with the stock exchange for the 
purpose of enhancing the dissemination of information. 
Most importantly, sanctions in 2008 became deterrent as the law 
imposed EGP 2000 for every day of delay in submitting the financial reports.152 
Further, it imposed five years of imprisonment and up to EGP 20 million in case 
of disseminating false information.153 Moreover, enforcement of these rules had 
become aggressive and by the end of September 2003, 99 companies had been 
delisted for failing to observe the new listing rules. Since then, the Exchange has 
witnessed waves of delisting for noncompliance. This made the number of listed 
companies fall from more than 1000 in 2001 to 189 in 2010.154  
c.     Reputational Intermediaries  
Another considerable shift in legislative policy was noticeable in this 
decade, especially after 2004, as more consideration was given to financial 
intermediaries. Thus, creating quality disclosure and transparency rules in this era 
focused on both corporations and auditors. For instance, the Egyptian Accounting 
Standards were developed in 2006155 to replace the old ones; further, in 2008, the 
Egyptian Auditing Standards were developed in accordance with the 
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international standards.156 The CML was also amended to require the 
establishment of a record for auditors who are licensed to audit listed 
companies.157 The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (“EFSA”), which 
replaced the CMA,158 accordingly created the Auditors Oversight Board. It also 
sets the conditions upon which auditors can be registered, imposes periodic 
examinations, and maintains records about auditors that are updated on a regular 
basis with the findings of the periodic examination and remarks of the quality of 
work of the registered auditors. Finally, it can suspend auditors for a specific 
time or remove them from the registry in cases of violations.159 These records are 
publicly available on the EFSA website, and corporations are obliged to choose 
their auditors from the registered ones. Any violation is accessible by the public 
and potential employers.  
Noticeably, the reformations were also concerned with market and 
economic stability during this period and after the partial growth of the market. 
Therefore, the first thing the law dealt with in this era was the financial 
soundness of the brokerage firms and other companies dealing in securities, 
requiring a minimum paid up capital of EGP 5 million. In addition, the EFSA 
promulgated comprehensive financial solvency standards to limit the risks 
associated with their activities, while the executive regulation of the CML laid 
the obligations and restrictions for such companies. The legislator thus imposed 
extensive disclosure requirements and set rules for conflict of interests. Further, 
intermediaries and all their employees were required to be registered with the 
exchange. The exchange, in turn, sets minimum educational requirements and 
requires such employees to pass a certain exam before they can be registered 
with the exchange.  
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d.    Related Party Transactions 
Regulation of self-dealing and insider trading has been tightening the 
screws on insiders. For example, the listing rules required ex ante notification of 
GA to any transaction that any board member is party of and to seek the GA’s 
approval in advance.160 In the same sense, the listing requirements enjoined 
corporations to set mechanisms that prohibit insiders from dealing on information 
that is not publicly available and set a minimum black out period of 15 days prior 
to dissemination of information and three days after, during which insiders are 
totally banned from trading.161 It also required insiders and the corporation to 
inform the EGX whenever they trade in securities of the company, which in turn 
publishes such information.162 Moreover, the executive regulation for CML 
added a new chapter in 2006 for insider trading and price manipulation.163 This 
chapter defined price manipulation and stipulated–as an example–what can be 
considered per se manipulations.164 These include, inter alia, spreading incorrect 
information, wash trading, painting the tape, and spreading rumors.165 It also 
defined who can be an insider and what can constitute inside information that is 
prohibited.166 It widened the scope of prohibition and established a tipper-tippee 
liability.167 Finally, the law has dramatically increased the penalties imposed on 
those committing such crimes, which became a minimum of two years of 
imprisonment and/or EGP 20 million.168 
e.    Takeover Regulation 
Takeover stayed unregulated, except by one article (which was totally 
unsatisfactory), until 2007, when the Ministerial Decree No. 12 for 2007 added a 
new chapter to the executive regulation of CML that furnishes a comprehensive 
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regulation for hostile takeovers.169 The hostile takeover law is modeled on the 
French law: it imposes a mandatory tender offer to all outstanding shares upon 
crossing a certain threshold, and as per the non-interference rule on board of 
directors asserting that no action can be taken by the board that have detrimental 
effect on the offer.170 Moreover, article 357 gives the EFSA the power to force 
the new controlling shareholder (upon existence of certain conditions) to buy the 
shares of minority shareholders.   
f.     Enforcement 
Enforcement also improved significantly in this decade: starting from 
2003, the Exchange started delisting noncompliant corporations. Further, the 
EFSA replaced the Capital Market Authority, Egyptian Insurance Supervisory 
Authority, and the Mortgage Finance Authority as it became the supervisor of all 
non-banking financial instruments and markets. The first aim stated in the 
byelaws is for the Authority to protect investors and work on the development of 
the financial markets.  
Moreover, the law created an obligatory dispute resolution committee 
and it made it mandatory to file a complaint with the EFSA before filing a 
case.171 There was an attempt to solve disputes by compulsory arbitration in order 
to mitigate the inefficiencies of the court system and ensure access to justice, but 
this rule was declared unconstitutional.172 Therefore, in 2008, Egypt created 
economic courts to adjudicate commercial and financial matters, inter alia capital 
market disputes, allowing for first time mediation and putting a 12-month time 
frame on dispute resolution.173 In addition, judges are obliged to take economic 
training before being able to sit in the economic court. In short, there has been a 
considerable progress in enforcement, whether from the regulator (where 
allocated budget has increased continuously since 2000) or the courts.  
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Last but not least, the reformations also endeavored to deepen the capital 
market and increase its liquidity by introducing a number of techniques such as 
margin trading,174 online trading,175 intraday trading, enabling investors to benefit 
from same day price fluctuations, and introducing and regulating 
securitization.176 An investor protection fund was also created to protect investors 
in case of insolvency of brokerage firms. Finally, the legislator incentivized 
corporations and the public to participate in the capital market through the new 
Income Tax Law No. 91 of year 2005 which set corporate tax at 20% of their net 
yearly profit177 and removed any taxes on the gain of investors that resulted from 
investments in securities registered in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (whether 
profits are achieved through trading in them or through payment of dividends).178  
g.     Stock Market Reaction to the Second Wave of Changes,      
Political Incentives, and the Transplantation 
 
The market positively responded to the new wave of reforms.  In 2005, 
Egypt was ranked first in economic reformations across the globe as a number of 
reforms were introduced. 179 This time, the reforms were not solely confined to 
legal rules but also targeted the institutions and enforcement mechanisms.  
In brief, bigger steps were taken toward a more efficient capital market 
in the last few years. This is evident in the significant progress of the regulatory, 
legal, and institutional developments.180 The improvements were followed by 
stricter measures in enforcing the law and corporate governance rules, which led 
to a wave of delisting companies that did not comply with the listing 
requirements.181 The number of listed firms fell from more than 1000 in 2001 to 
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306 in 2009,182 and even more companies were delisted in 2010 due to failing to 
commit to the listing and new disclosure requirements.183  
The public float in the 50 most active companies increased from around 
twenty percent in 2001 to around average of forty-five percent in 2009.184 
Moreover, the turnover ratio increased to around seventy percent in 2008 before 
it goes down to around fifty percent in 2009.185 Further, the volume and number 
of listed transactions increased significantly, and the companies listed on the 
Exchange included a diverse range of industries. This positive impact can be 
demonstrated by Table (1), which shows the ascent in value and volume of the 
traded securities from 2003 to 2008. Additionally, Table (2) shows that in 2008, 
the market capitalization reached about ninety percent of the GDP before the 
numbers dropped in 2009 as a consequence of the global crisis. Moreover, the 
positive effects of the reformations were also evident in the amount of foreign 
direct investments that increased from $2.1 billion in 2002 to $13.2 billion in 
2008-2009 before it fell to $6.8 billion as a result of the financial crisis in 2010. 
This indicated that the country was on the right track with the economic growth 
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Value and Volume of Traded Securities and Bonds (2003/ – 2008)187 
Item 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Value Traded (LE 
million) 
27,349 72,831 241,443 261,639 553,239 280,025 
Monthly Average 
(LE million) 












Market Capitalization (2003 – 2008) 188 
Item 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Market Capitalization 
(LE billion) 




35.63 62.62 61.03 80.83 90.72 45.97 
 
What explains these reformations? Again, political choices and 
incumbents’ interests are the answer. Of course, the existing ruling coalition had 
an interest in introducing these reformations.189 Gamal Mubarak, while being 
groomed to lead the regime after his father, was not a military person and needed 
the support of the business elite. Thus, Gamal was the architect of the new 
cabinet of 2005 as a number of members were directly linked to him and came to 
office pushing for financial sector reform. 
In fact, the financial market’s development was in this group’s best 
interest.190 The opening of the market for foreign banks would increase the 
availability of credit, instead of only depending on the credit provided by public 
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banks that were on the decline.191 The new banking entrants would not endanger 
the position of those players because they already had monopolistic positions in 
the market.192 Further, they are the only players that new entrants can extend 
credit to; since Egypt had no system of credit bureaus, the new entering foreign 
banks would have difficulty in assessing the creditworthiness of other medium or 
small size enterprises.193  
On one hand, capital market development represented a new opportunity 
for financing the elite’s corporations, and, again, there was no fear of competition 
from other players. Hence, in as thin of a market as Egypt, where the cost of 
financing is high, only big and renowned corporations could benefit from such a 
financing tool.194 Further, the capital market represented a very important vehicle 
for the business elite to transfer part of their ownership and profits abroad.195 It 
also helped them grasp investments from abroad to their companies, thus 
increasing available financing options. Capital markets also represented a 
possibility for them to partner with foreign companies. As for the increased 
burdens that the development of the capital market would bring, this was not a 
problem for their corporations since most of them were already listed on foreign 
exchanges abroad and were subject to such high burdens.  
On the other hand, the regime had a strong dual sided incentive in 
surveillance and development of strong institutions in this field: (1) building a 
reputable capital market to finance corporations would help economic growth of 
the country and consequently, send a positive message to the international 
community (especially, this would benefit Gamal Mubarak in his strive to 
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presidential palace);196 and (2) the corporations would be able to obtain finance in 
an arm’s length from the government through the stock markets, and that the size 
of the funds available for the corporations could not be closely monitored or 
restricted by the government.197 This endangers the government’s control over 
the business and finance in the country. To minimize this effect, the government 
created the monitoring agencies directly appointed by the president and only 
answerable to him. Moreover, appointees did not have a maximum serving 
period. Consequently, the government ensured having full control over 
enforcement. Further, this trepidation from inability to control finance is clearly 
evident in the EFSA and EGX enforcement of disclosure rules. The more the 
stock market became active, the harsher the enforcement for the disclosure 
requirements became.198 Further, the EGX has continuously updated its system to 
be able to monitor trades on a real time basis.  
In short, there were incentives for both the business elites and political 
elites to have a reputable stock market at home. The government, particularly, 
had the incentives to control this market. So, it created the required institutions 
and continuously increased its budget to be able to cope with its expansion. 
Further, Gamal Mubarak’s interests in the presidency and presenting and 
depicting himself to the outer world as a potential successor to his father made 
him strive to present himself as different from his father. He tried to represent 
himself as a neoliberal thinker and believer. He realized that the widening of the 
financial market was in the interest of the business elites.  
This does not mean that reformations were perfect or that the 
enforcement was adequate. The above reformation does not make Egypt have a 
deep capital market that resembles those found in developed countries. The 
reason for this lag, again, is not legal tradition but political choice, since the 
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enforcement of the regulations was selective. The political authorities favored 
certain investors and connected elites to benefit from expropriation of other 
investors, thus willfully undermining the quality of the legislation and the 
protection afforded to investors. For instance, there was not one single insider 
trading case reported from 1992 until 2008.199 Further, according to capital 
market law, the chairman of the EFSA (which is directly appointed by the 
president) can drop charges against violators, a process which is done away from 
the scrutiny of the public.200 It can be said that the government gave the 
businessmen the carrots that insured their loyalty in the shape of monopolies and 
cheap lands. At the same time, the government built institutions that could record 
the corruption of these businessmen as a stick that can be used any time by 
keeping the executive agencies under their direct control. 
h.    Summary  
At the beginning of this phase, the distribution of power changed, and 
more power was channeled to emerging business elites. Thus, the ruling elite had 
to include them in the ruling coalition. This was evident by the 2005 cabinet 
reshuffle. When the business elite themselves became a part of the ruling 
coalition and had accumulated enough resources and rent during the preceding 
phase, introducing broad changes in capital market institutions did not present a 
danger that challenged either the ruling elites or the business elites. In fact, the 
changes presented a further chance for acquiring additional resources. Further, 
for the ruling elite to ensure that the relative power of the business elite does not 
supersede theirs, they had an interest in building the necessary institutions and 
enforce them when necessary. Of course, because the business elite now have 
enough power, they resisted the enforcement of many of the built institutions, 
and mostly those institutions were enforced against non-connected business 
players. As for the connected players, these institutions worked as a bargaining 
chip. It intentionally left leeway for the rent seekers to benefit to be able to 
ensure their allegiance. Thus, while the law was evolving during this period, 
business and political elites intervened in different times to manipulate the law 
for their interest. For instance, though there were no insider trading cases till 
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2008, after the 2011 Revolution, 23 businessmen, including Hosni Mubarak’s 
sons, were charged for insider trading and price manipulations, which means that 
EFSA has recorded the faults, but actions were halted by the regime.201 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND TAKEAWAYS FOR DEVELOPMENT 
AGENCIES 
The decision to develop a country’s financial market is clearly a policy 
choice. In its essence, it is a distributive choice.202 As made clear from the 
literature review and the case study, the effectiveness of legal institutions, their 
enforcement, and their evolution are directly affected by the support of the 
existing polity and whether the power distribution in the country is supportive or 
antagonistic to these institutions. So, when development agencies give policy 
recommendations to such countries, ignoring the politics and distribution of 
power, the outcome is futile.203 There is a need to comprehend the division of 
power in the existing political settlements to implement viable reforms. As the 
case study shows, institutions that work perfectly in some contexts may not be 
functional and effective in others. 
The main determinant of the effectiveness of the institutions is not the 
legal tradition, as conventional wisdom purports, but the political reality in the 
country introducing these institutions. More precisely, a greater attention should 
be given to the political settlement in the country and whether it can be 
supportive of the proposed institutions or not.  
Importantly, development agencies should be attentive that “societies 
may choose the wrong policies and institutions, or even pursue disastrous courses 
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of action, because these choices are not made for the benefit of society as a 
whole, but for the benefit of those who control political power.”204 
Daron Acemglu and James Robinson raise another critical problem of 
policy advice without considering its political affect.205 They argue that policy 
choices taken at one point in time usually strengthen some groups and weaken 
others. This directly affects the political equilibrium at a later point in time.206 
Therefore, the pursuit of economic reforms that change the distribution of rents 
in society should be done cautiously.207 Even if such reforms are well 
intentioned, they could tilt the balance of power even further toward the already 
powerful groups.208 Thus, when it comes to policies that affect distribution of 
income and rents, its ramifications on future political equilibria should be 
scrutinized.209 
This negative effect that Acemoglu and Robinson described is exactly 
what happened in the case of Egypt. The IMF, involved in the reformations in 
Egypt, did not consider the political reality prevalent in the country. This led to 
policy recommendations that allowed the regime to manipulate the reformations 
for their gains. As discussed above, the country introduced reformations 
gradually until enough ties were created with business elites, resulting in a 
system of crony capitalism, where business elites were left to expropriate and 
create conglomerates and monopolies while protecting them from competition in 
return of their allegiance.  
The introduced economic reformations had political consequences at the 
time of their adoption and have also had a reverberating effect to date. Even after 
the collapse of Mubarak’s Regime, Egypt is left with powerful business elites 
that have large market shares and monopolies in different sectors of the 
economy. Furthermore, they will fight to retain the rents that they used to capture 
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under Hosni Mubarak. To give an example of this fact, when president Morsi 
came to power in 2012, he tried to pass a tax on share profits. After issuing the 
law, tremendous pressure came from the financial sector leading to the repealing 
of the law only two weeks after its introduction.210  
 This shows how the economic reforms that the IMF advocated at the 
beginning of the 1990s affected Egyptian politics both at that time and today, 
with no loss of momentum. In conclusion, “one size fits all” reforms are not 
functional and should be abandoned in favor of a more tailored policy that 
incorporates a study of power division and political realities.  
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